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The Hedge Fund Holdup 
THE SEC’S REPEATED UNNECESSARY  
ATTACKS ON THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hedge funds have produced vastly different results for 
investors in 2008. Some have profited by immense amounts, 
while others have suffered great losses at the hands of funds 
that collapsed as a result of the subprime credit crisis.1 
Irrespective of their success, most hedge fund investors would 
agree on one thing: the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) should not regulate hedge funds. 
The public debate over whether to regulate hedge funds 
began in late 2004 when the SEC released a proposed regula-
tion of hedge funds. This proposal, known as the Hedge Fund 
Rule,2 was finalized after a period of public comment, and took 
effect on February 1, 2006.3 The purpose of this Rule was to 
  
 1 Beginning in the summer of 2007, the country was hit by what has become 
known as the “subprime credit crisis.” Borrowing money is of key importance, as credit 
funds everything from the mergers of large corporations to consumer home loans. The 
subprime credit crisis has in part been driven by the default of many home loans that 
were made to “subprime” borrowers, that is, those having less than stellar credit. In 
2007, a series of defaults by these subprime debtors caused the credit markets to 
tighten and shut off the easy access to credit that borrowers enjoyed previously. This 
caused a chain reaction that affected even the largest of banks as many of the original 
loans were repackaged and sold in a variety of investment products. For a detailed 
account of the many stories that have been spawned by this crisis, see Reuters.com, 
Subprime Mortgage Trouble, http://www.reuters.com/news/globalcoverage/subprime 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2008). 
  Most recently, Henry Paulson, Secretary of the Treasury, introduced a 
sweeping proposal to change the entire financial regulatory system in the United 
States. See Damian Palletta et al, Plan Begins Battle Over How to Police Market—
Amid Crisis, a Bid to Shuffle Powers; Fast Fixes Unlikely, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2008, 
at A1. This proposal includes such long-term goals as reducing the power of the SEC 
and giving the Federal Reserve regulatory oversight authority. Although the short-
term goal is the creation of a Mortgage Origination Commission to monitor mortgage 
lending, it is unlikely that anything will be accomplished, given that it is a presidential 
election year and that these changes would affect every executive agency affiliated with 
the financial markets. Id. 
 2 See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 3 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 
69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Rule Release]. (The rule 
that was created by this release was vacated on June 23, 2006.) 
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increase hedge fund accountability through mandatory filings.4 
Prior to this regulation, hedge funds had not been required to 
register with the SEC and thus were exempt from regulatory 
and disclosure mandates. The new rule required almost all 
hedge funds to register, thereby giving the SEC substantially 
greater control and eliminating the secrecy with which hedge 
funds had been operating.5 The rule, however, was not in effect 
for very long. Phillip Goldstein, co-owner of two hedge funds, 
challenged the rule on the basis that it misinterpreted an 
existing regulation.6 On June 26, 2006, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in favor of 
Goldstein, vacating the Hedge Fund Rule.7 
The SEC chose not to appeal the decision to the 
Supreme Court, instead formulating as a replacement for the 
Hedge Fund Rule two new proposals in late December 2006.8 
One proposal was a pair of anti-fraud provisions, increasing the 
accountability of hedge fund manager conduct as well as the 
amount of information released to investors.9 The SEC later 
adopted this rule on September 10, 2007.10 The second proposal, 
the “Accredited Investor Proposal”—released in December 2006 
and further revised in August 200711—is a push to increase the 
minimum amount that an investor must have in net worth in 
order to invest in hedge funds.12 This is a proposed change to 
Regulation D,13 a set of regulatory provisions that allows for 
certain investment vehicles to escape registration with the SEC 
  
 4 See id. at 72,054. 
 5 Id. Hedge fund secrecy has become something of a legend throughout the 
financial world. Those involved in hedge funds are so tight lipped that some employees 
were even reluctant to discuss their daily commute with reporters for fear of reprisal 
from the hedge fund manager. See Michael S. Schmidt, A Trader’s Train to Wall Street, 
Conn., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006. 
 6 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874, 878. 
 7 Id. at 884. 
 8 Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; 
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 2,576, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 
275) [hereinafter Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals]. 
 9 Id. at 400. 
 10 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2008). 
 11 See Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 45,116 (Aug. 10, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 200, 230, and 239) [hereinafter 
August 2007 Revision]. 
 12 Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 400 n.4 (“We are 
proposing a rule that would revise the requirements for determining whether an 
individual is eligible to invest in certain pooled investment vehicles.”). 
 13 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508. 
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if they conform to specific requirements.14 These latest pro-
posals have prompted the hedge fund industry to take notice: 
the SEC is not walking away. 
This Note will argue that the recent rules promulgated 
by the SEC demonstrate the Commission’s insistence on 
keeping a regulatory hand in the hedge fund industry without 
considering the necessity, effectiveness, or consistency behind 
its rules. Moreover, the combination of existing hedge fund 
practices and the requirements of Regulation D make further 
regulation unnecessary to protect investors. Part II of this Note 
will briefly explain what hedge funds are and will set forth the 
applicable statutes and rules that control the hedge fund 
industry. Part III will outline the SEC proposals, the defunct 
Hedge Fund Rule, the anti-fraud rules, and the Accredited 
Investor Proposal. Part IV will analyze the reasons behind both 
the anti-fraud rules and the Accredited Investor Proposal, and 
will focus on the lack of necessity for the rules and the 
inconsistencies between them. Additionally, the arbitrary 
nature by which the SEC created the Accredited Investor 
Proposal will be discussed. Finally, Part V will illustrate how 
additional SEC regulations, with the stated purpose of pro-
tecting small investors, are unnecessary due to a combination 
of current hedge fund practices and Regulation D provisions 
that sufficiently protects small investors.15 
II. HEDGE FUNDS AND THE RULES THAT GOVERN THEM 
“Hedge fund” has become a buzzword whose use has 
extended far beyond the financial communities of Wall Street 
and Greenwich, Connecticut.16 As a part of the national news 
landscape, hedge fund activities and the regulations that affect 
them have become a regular feature in national newspapers 
and on the evening news. To provide context for a discussion of 
the SEC’s initiatives, this Part describes what hedge funds  
are and briefly examines the securities regulations that affect 
them. 
  
 14 See Investopedia.com, Regulation D, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/ 
regulationd.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
 15 “Small investors” in this Note refers to investors with a relatively small 
amount of capital, as opposed to wealthy individuals or institutional investors such as 
pension funds. 
 16 Greenwich, Connecticut has become the Wall Street of the hedge fund 
industry, fast becoming a hub of this low-key industry. For an interesting article about 
Greenwich and its link to the hedge fund world, see Schmidt, supra note 5. 
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A. Hedge Funds: What Are They and What Do They Do? 
Defining the term “hedge fund” is not a simple task. 
Securities law has never formally defined the term.17 A basic 
working definition is that a hedge fund is a pool of money 
managed by a professional who designs strategies to maximize 
return18 and that has certain limits in place as to who may 
invest in the fund.19 In addition, hedge funds have traditionally 
been characterized by their lack of registration with the SEC, 
thereby allowing them the freedom to avoid reporting invest-
ment activities.20 
Hedge funds offer three main benefits to their investors: 
(1) they provide diversification by investing in a wide array of 
typical financial products, including more complex and higher 
risk investments such as derivatives;21 (2) they attempt to 
remain uncorrelated to the stock or bond markets,22 giving 
  
 17 William Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Concerning Investor 
Protection Implications of Hedge Funds Before the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs (Apr. 10, 2003), available at www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ 
041003tswhd.htm. 
 18 “Return” is defined as “the gain or loss of a security in a particular period.” 
Investopedia.com, Return, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/return.asp (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2008). Return comprises both the income from an investment as well as the 
capital increase of the investment. Id. 
 19 See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting the 
PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE 
LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1 (1999) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S 
WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS.]); see also Jessica Natali, Trimming the Hedges Is a 
Difficult Task: The SEC’s Attempt to Regulate Hedge Funds Falls Short of Expectations, 
15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 113, 116 (2007). In addition to restrictions on who may invest, 
hedge funds generally require lockups whereby an investor agrees to be barred from 
withdrawing his investment capital for a specified length of time. 
 20 See SEC, STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATION OF THE 
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS viii (2003) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf. 
 21 A derivative is “a security whose price is dependent upon or derived from 
one or more underlying assets.” Investopedia, Derivative, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/d/derivative.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). A “future” is a common form of a 
derivative consisting of a contract to buy or sell an asset at an agreed upon price on a 
certain date in the future. The contract itself is then bought and sold on a secondary 
market. Much of the risk of derivatives is whether the price of the underlying asset will 
decline or increase by the agreed upon date. Common underlying assets include 
“stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates and market indexes.” Id.; see 
also STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 4-5. 
 22 The advantage to investors who invest in hedge funds that attempt to be 
uncorrelated to these markets is that the value of the fund will not necessarily 
fluctuate when those markets go up or down. This allows for a counterbalancing of the 
risks in investing in the stock and bond markets. STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 5. 
For an example and in-depth explanation of how some hedge funds attempt to hedge 
against the general markets, see KEITH H. BLACK, MANAGING A HEDGE FUND 39-40 
(2004). 
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investors a method of further reducing broad systemic risk;23 
and (3) they offer complex investment strategies, including 
short selling,24 which allow hedge funds to “hedge” against the 
decline of that investment.25 A typical example of a hedging 
technique is when a fund buys an underlying asset, a stock for 
example, and then sells a futures contract for that stock at a 
certain price.26 This technique hedges against a decline in the 
stock’s value as the investor has ensured that he will have a 
buyer for the stock at the set price.27 Some hedge funds still 
strategize to exclusively provide protection from a fall in the 
broader markets, although many of them have become pure 
profit machines at the expense of risk diversification.28 
B. Hedge Fund Governance Law 
Most hedge funds have been able to avoid SEC registra-
tion and reporting requirements through a variety of statutory 
exemptions. This section provides a brief background of the 
current regulatory structure that allows hedge funds to operate 
in “secrecy” and the statutes that the SEC seeks to modify.29 
In order to better understand the laws affecting hedge 
funds, it is important to understand generally what each of  
the governing acts accomplishes. When a security30 is offered 
  
 23 STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 5. 
 24 “Short selling” is defined as “[t]he selling of a security that the seller  
does not own . . . . Short sellers assume that they will be able to buy the stock at  
a lower price than that at which they sold short.” Investopedia, Short Selling, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortselling.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). 
 25 STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 5. 
 26 A futures contract is a contract to buy or sell an underlying security  
at a set price on a specific date. Investopedia.com, Futures Contract, http:// 
www.investopedia.com/terms/f/futurescontract.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). 
 27 Investopedia, Hedge, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedge.asp (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2008). 
 28 Hedge Fund Rule Release, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 237, 69 
Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004). For a full discussion of the various trading 
practices that hedge funds employ, see PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., 
supra note 19, at 4-5. 
 29 For a full account of the various statutes and regulations that affect hedge 
funds, see STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 11-32. 
 30 A “security” is defined by the Securities Act of 1933 as 
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of 
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, 
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or 
other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any 
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any 
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for sale, it is governed by the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities 
Act”).31 This Act has two purposes: The first is to provide an 
investor with significant information concerning the security 
being offered for sale.32 The second is to prohibit fraud in the 
offering of the security.33 The Securities Exchange Act of 193434 
is a broad statute that covers securities industry participants, 
including brokerage firms, clearing agencies, and the actual 
security exchanges.35 It has many different components and 
includes the registration of exchanges, a prohibition of insider 
trading, and the requirement that certain investors must 
report their holdings to the SEC.36 
The final two acts relevant to this discussion are the 
Investment Company Act of 194037 and the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940.38 The Investment Company Act regulates 
companies, such as mutual funds,39 that invest and trade for 
others. The purpose of the act is to provide the public with 
  
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, 
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to 
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known 
as a “‘security,” or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or 
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)(2006). This definition includes essentially every financial product 
and therefore puts almost every sale of a financial product under the auspices of the 
Securities Act. 
 31 Id. § 77a. 
 32 SEC, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/laws.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2008) (“This information enables investors, not 
the government, to make informed judgments about whether to purchase a company’s 
securities. . . . Investors who purchase securities and suffer losses have important 
recovery rights if they can prove that there was incomplete or inaccurate disclosure of 
important information.”). 
 33 Id. 
 34 15 U.S.C. § 78a. 
 35 SEC, supra note 32. The security exchanges that are covered by the 
Securities Exchange Act include the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock 
Exchange, and the NASDAQ. Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1. 
 38 Id. § 80b-1. 
 39 The SEC describes a mutual fund as follows: 
A mutual fund is a company that pools money from many investors and 
invests the money in stocks, bonds, short-term money-market instruments, 
other securities or assets, or some combination of these investments. The 
combined holdings the mutual fund owns are known as its portfolio. Each 
share represents an investor’s proportionate ownership of the fund’s holdings 
and the income those holdings generate. 
SEC, Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/ 
investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). 
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information about the fund and its objectives, including its 
structure and operation.40 This is accomplished through regular 
disclosures to the SEC.41 The Investment Advisers Act is a 
companion act, and governs the role of the investment advisor 
to a fund or investment company. This Act requires that the 
advisor register with the SEC and provide certain disclosures 
directly to the agency with the purpose of protecting the 
individual investor from fraud perpetrated by the advisor.42 
1. The Securities Act of 1933 
The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is to provide 
for disclosure and accountability to investors through manda-
tory registration with the SEC.43 Without an exemption, any 
company issuing a security to the public is required to register 
with the SEC and provide information about the issuer and the 
security.44 The specific requirements of disclosure include a 
description of the properties and business owned by the 
company issuing the security, a description of the security 
being sold, information about the management of the company 
issuing the security, and financial statements of the company.45 
Hedge funds must comply with the mandatory requirements 
under the Securities Act because they sell a security to their 
investors.46 Thus, unless they fall within an exception, they 
must comply with all of the disclosure requirements.47 
As a companion to the Securities Act, the SEC created a 
regulation48 with the express purpose of exempting certain 
  
 40 SEC, supra note 32. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 13-14. 
 44 See id. 
 45 SEC, supra note 32. 
 46 Unless a security is registered with the SEC, it is prohibited from being 
sold under the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2006) (“Unless a registration is in 
effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person directly, or indirectly . . . to 
carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means 
or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for 
delivery after sale.”).  
 47 STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 13. 
 48 The SEC is an administrative agency that derives its power from the 
executive branch. Congress will typically set up a broad statute that sets out what  
it would like to accomplish, and then the administrative agency creates regulations 
with the purpose of carrying out Congress’s mandate. Cornell University Law School, 
Administrative Law, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/index.php/Administrative_law (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2008). 
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types of companies from the requirement to register with the 
SEC. Regulation D,49 enacted in 1982, provides three exemp-
tions for certain private companies from registering with the 
SEC.50 These exemptions are known as Rules 504, 505, and 
506.51 Rule 506 is the exemption used most widely by hedge 
funds.52 This Rule allows a company to avoid registration as 
long as it does not make a general solicitation or advertise- 
ment to the public, and allows only “accredited investors” to 
invest.53 An accredited investor is an individual with a net 
worth or joint net worth above $1,000,000, or total income 
above $200,000 or joint income of $300,000.54 For institutional 
investors,55 the accredited investor standard is higher, requir-
ing $5,000,000 in investment assets.56 
Funds that take advantage of the Rule 506 exemption 
must obey the strict restriction on the marketing of the funds. 
This restriction prohibits the marketing of 
securities by any form of general solicitation or general advertising, 
including, but not limited to, the following: (1) [a]ny advertisement, 
article, notice or other communication published in any newspaper, 
magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television or radio; and 
(2) [a]ny seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by 
any general solicitation or general advertising.57 
The solicitation restriction applies to private placements of 
securities over the Internet as well.58 This restriction complies 
with the thrust of the exemption, which is specifically targeted 
  
 49 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2008). 
 50 August 2007 Revision, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116, 45,116 (Aug. 10, 2007). 
 51 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.506. 
 52 Id. § 230.506; see also August 2007 Revision, 72 Fed. Reg. at 45,116. Rules 
501 through 503 “contain definitions, conditions, and other provisions that apply 
generally throughout Regulation D.” Id. Rule 504 contains an exemption for companies 
that offer less than $1,000,000 in securities to the public in a 12 month period. Rule 
505 exempts up to $5,000,000 in securities offered in a 12 month period, as long as the 
offering company does not make a general advertisement or solicitation. Id. at 45,116-
17. 
 53 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. Rule 506 states: “To qualify for an exemption under 
this section, offers and sales must satisfy all the terms and conditions of §§ 230.501 and 
230.502.” Id. Rule 501 contains the definition of “accredited investor,” and Rule 502 
requires the exempted issuer to comply with the prohibitions on advertising. 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 230.501-.502; see also STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 15. 
 54 STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 15; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). 
 55 Institutional investors include banks, insurance companies, pension funds 
and other large scale investors. See August 2007 Revision, 72 Fed. Reg. at 45,123 n.8. 
 56 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3). 
 57 Id. § 230.502(c)(1)-(2). 
 58 STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 16-17. 
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at private investment vehicles. By restricting mass advertising, 
the SEC ensures that the investment vehicle is indeed 
“private.” 
2. Investment Company Act of 1940 
The Investment Company Act is quite broad, governing 
any company that “holds itself out as being engaged primarily, 
or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, 
reinvesting, or trading in securities.”59 This encompasses all 
types of funds including hedge funds and mutual funds. The 
Act requires that the companies report their financial condition 
and investment policies to investors on a regular basis as well 
as when new securities are sold.60 Hedge funds employ one of 
two exemptions to avoid the requirements of the Act.61 First, if 
a hedge fund has less than 100 investors and does not offer the 
securities to the general public, it is exempt from the require-
ments of the Investment Company Act.62 Second, a hedge fund 
can exempt itself from the requirements, while retaining the 
ability to have unlimited numbers of investors, as long as the 
investors in the fund are “qualified purchasers.”63 A “qualified 
purchaser” is any investor who has at least $5 million in 
investments.64 Thus, although the Investment Company Act 
covers practically all hedge funds, most hedge funds are able to 
avoid registration by virtue of being “qualified purchasers” or 
by limiting participation in the fund to less than 100 investors. 
  
 59 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 60  SEC, supra note 32. 
 61 Id. 
 62 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (“None of the following persons is an investment 
company within the meaning of this subchapter. . . Any issuer whose outstanding 
securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one 
hundred persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a 
public offering of its securities.”). 
 63 Id. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A) (“None of the following persons is an investment 
company within the meaning of this subchapter . . . . Any issuer, the outstanding 
securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of 
such securities, are qualified purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that 
time propose to make a public offering of such securities.”). 
 64 Id. § 80a-2(a)(51) (“Any natural person (including any person who holds a 
joint, community property, or other similar shared ownership interest in an issuer that 
is excepted under section 80a-3(c)(7) of this title with that person’s qualified purchaser 
spouse) who owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments, as defined by the 
Commission.”). 
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3. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was created to 
allow the SEC to monitor advisors to funds and streamline any 
fraud investigations, as well as to better respond to complaints 
by investors against an advisor.65 Almost all advisors to hedge 
funds fall under the definition of “investment advisor” in the 
Advisers Act.66 The Advisers Act requires that advisors register 
with the SEC and provide the SEC with a bevy of information, 
including the manner in which the advisor provides advice, the 
basis upon which the advisor is compensated, and the balance 
sheet of the advisor.67 In addition, the Advisers Act prohibits 
fraud by advisors perpetrated against the managed fund.68 
Hedge fund advisors generally utilize an exemption to 
registration under the Advisers Act, thereby avoiding the 
disclosure requirements.69 The exemption applies to advisors 
who have fewer than fifteen “clients” and who do not hold 
themselves out as advisors to the public or to a registered 
investment company under the Investment Company Act of 
1940.70 Although most advisors advise funds that have more 
than fifteen individual investors, the SEC traditionally in its 
  
 65 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 66 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (“ ‘Investment adviser’ means any person who, for 
compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as  
part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning  
securities . . . .”). 
 67 Id. § 80b-3(c)(1). Other examples of disclosure requirements under the 
Advisers Act include: the names and addresses of the advisor’s partners, officers, and 
directors of the fund; the advisor’s education and the past 10 years of business 
affiliations, as well as the current business affiliations of not only the advisor, but his 
partners, officers, and directors; whether the principal business of the investment 
advisor is the role of advising funds. See id. 
 68 Id. § 80b-6 (“It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the 
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly (1) 
to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; (2) 
to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud 
or deceit upon any client or prospective client.”). It is important to note the language of 
the act, which specifically uses the word “client.” Under the Hedge Fund Rule, the SEC 
attempted to change the definition of client, from the fund as a whole to an individual 
client. After the Hedge Fund Rule was vacated in Goldstein, the SEC created the anti-
fraud rules, which specifically prohibited fraud promulgated by an advisor against an 
individual investor, as opposed to the previous version that prevented fraud against 
the fund as a whole. See infra Part III.A. 
 69 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). The following discussion about the exception and 
the definition of the term “client” reflect the current state of the law, after the D.C. 
Circuit rejected the SEC’s contrary position in Goldstein. See infra Part III.A. 
 70 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). 
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regulations allowed for the fund itself to be considered a single 
“client.”71 An advisor may treat the entire fund as a single 
client, provided that the investment advice given is based on 
the entire organization’s objectives, and not on the objectives of 
any individual investor.72 This powerful exemption allows 
advisors that advise less than fifteen funds, although possibly 
hundreds of individual investors, to avoid registration with the 
SEC under the Advisers Act. Although the advisors to these 
funds are exempt from registration, the anti-fraud provisos of 
the Investment Advisers Act apply as they would to a 
registered advisor.73 This exemption, categorizing a “client” as 
the fund itself rather than the individual investors in the fund, 
was the target of the SEC’s failed 2004 Hedge Fund Rule.74 
In sum, the Securities Act requires the registration of 
any sale of a security. Most hedge funds, however, use 
Regulation D to avoid registration. The Investment Company 
Act requires registration by the company that issues the 
security, a requirement from which most hedge funds are 
exempted. Finally, the Investment Advisers Act governs the 
advisor to a fund and requires the registration and periodic 
monitoring of the advisor by the SEC. Hedge fund advisors 
utilize an exemption from registration for all advisors who have 
fewer than fifteen “clients.” Because an entire fund is deemed a 
“client” an advisor can avoid registration if he advises less than 
fifteen funds. This definition of “client” was the target of the 
SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule. 
III. THE SEC’S PROPOSALS: TWO ATTEMPTS 
The SEC’s rules have made a significant impact not only 
on the hedge fund industry, but on the entire financial 
community as well. This is a result of the SEC’s persistent 
attempts, beginning with the Hedge Fund Rule, to change the 
regulatory landscape affecting hedge funds. After the D.C. 
Circuit vacated the Hedge Fund Rule in Goldstein v. SEC,75 the 
SEC introduced two more provisions targeting the industry 
  
 71 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2)(i) (2004). This is the version of the rule 
prior to the enactment of the Hedge Fund Rule. Although Goldstein vacated the Hedge 
Fund Rule, a decision that the SEC itself has not challenged, the SEC has never 
changed its own regulation to reflect Goldstein. 
 72 Id. 
 73 STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 21. 
 74 See Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,058 (Dec. 10, 2004). 
 75 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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from a different angle. This section discusses the Hedge Fund 
Rule as well as the recent set of regulatory proposals. 
A. Changing the Investment Advisers Act: Redefining 
“Client” 
On December 10, 2004, the SEC approved and released 
the final version of what is now known as the Hedge Fund 
Rule.76 The purpose of the rule was to change the definition  
of the term “client” under the Advisers Act to include all 
individual investors in hedge funds. This change had the effect 
of requiring every advisor to a hedge fund with more than 
fifteen individual investors to register under the Investment 
Advisers Act. Additionally, the SEC sought to ensnare only 
hedge funds in the new regulation, purposely excluding 
venture capital funds77 that would not be subject to the 
requirement to register.78 
  
 76 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,054. The SEC articulated the 
rule and its purpose: 
The Commission is adopting a new rule and rule amendments under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The new rule and amendments require 
advisers to certain private investment pools (“hedge funds”) to register with 
the Commission under the Advisers Act. The rule and rule amendments are 
designed to provide the protections afforded by the Advisers Act to investors 
in hedge funds, and to enhance the Commission’s ability to protect our 
nation’s securities markets. 
Id. 
 77 A venture capital fund is an investment fund that specializes in providing 
start-up capital to small and mid-sized companies, and “[a]re generally characterized 
as high-risk/high-return opportunities.” Investopedia.com, Venture Capital Funds, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vcfund.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). 
 78 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,073. The SEC accomplished 
the targeting of hedge funds for registration by creating a separate regulation defining 
a “private fund.” The changed definition of “client” would only apply to a “private fund.” 
The SEC defined a “private fund” as containing three characteristics that are virtually 
uniform among hedge funds. Id. First, it included a fund that would be “subject to 
regulation under the Investment Company Act but for the exception from the definition 
of ‘investment company’ . . . .” Id. This refers to the exemption to the Investment 
Company Act for funds with less than one hundred investors, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) 
(2006), or that have only “qualified investors,” Id. § 80a-3(c)(7). Almost every hedge 
fund uses one of these exceptions to circumvent the requirements under the 
Investment Company Act. See supra Part II.B.2. The second characteristic of a “private 
fund,” is a fund that requires investors to lock up capital invested with them for a 
minimum of two years. Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,074. Finally, if a 
fund has “interests in it [that] are offered based on the investment advisory skills, 
ability or expertise of the investment advisor” (that is, the fund is professionally 
managed), it is a “private fund.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,075. Although most venture capital 
funds would be included in this rule, the SEC specifically exempted them. See infra 
text accompanying notes 200-201. 
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Under the new rule, advisors could no longer count the 
whole hedge fund as the client, but had to consider each 
investor in the fund as a single client.79 The effect of this 
amendment was to limit the registration exemption under the 
Act to hedge funds having fewer than fifteen investors. Funds 
with fifteen or more investors would be required to register 
with the SEC and be subject to the disclosure requirements  
of the Advisers Act.80 Additionally, as a companion to the pro-
posed re-definition of “client,” the SEC enacted a clarification to 
the disclosure requirements.81 Under the new disclosure rule, 
the vast majority of all hedge fund managers would be forced to 
allow the SEC to inspect the books of the hedge funds they 
manage in addition to the advisor’s own books.82 In doing so, 
the SEC could ensure that the advisor is performing his 
fiduciary duties to the fund.83 This one-two regulatory punch 
moved hedge funds from relative secrecy to a status only a few 
regulatory steps away from its highly transparent half-brother, 
the mutual fund.84 
Forcing hedge funds to register with the SEC was a 
short-lived requirement. Immediately after it took effect in 
February 2006,85 the requirement came under attack by Philip 
Goldstein in Goldstein v. SEC.86 In reaching its conclusion, the 
D.C. Circuit Court conducted an in-depth review of the history 
of the use of the word “client” in the investment advisor arena, 
and the definition that Congress, the courts, and the SEC itself 
used over the history of the Advisers Act.87 In June 2006, the 
  
 79 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2007) (“[Y]ou must count as clients the 
shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries . . . of a private fund. . . .”). 
 80 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,075. 
 81 The clarification was made to apply to those funds that were now defined 
as “private funds.” 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(e)(3)(ii). 
 82 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,076. 
 83 Id. (“Our examiners require access to these records to determine whether a 
hedge fund adviser is meeting its fiduciary obligations to a private fund under the 
Advisers Act and rules.”). 
 84  As a result of the Hedge Fund Rule, hedge funds and their advisors 
would be forced to allow the SEC to examine their operations. This has generally been 
the case with mutual funds, which are highly regulated and are forced to report to the 
SEC a tremendous amount of information including books and trading positions. See 
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2007 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK app. A 
(47th ed. 2007), available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2007_factbook.pdf. 
 85 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,054. 
 86 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 87 Id. at 873, 878-84. The court was highly critical of the SEC’s change to the 
definition of the word “client.” Specifically, the court considered that the SEC was a 
regulatory agency, lacking the power to change a definition that was established by 
Congress. Id. at 878. Furthermore, the court criticized the policy behind the change, 
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court held that the SEC’s attempt to shift the definition of the 
term “client” from the hedge fund itself to those who invest in a 
fund was supported neither by statutory interpretation nor by 
the twenty-year precedent set by the SEC in using the term.88 
By vacating the Hedge Fund Rule, the D.C. Circuit Court left 
the SEC with two options: appeal the case to the Supreme 
Court, or create a new rule. 
B.  The SEC’s Second Attempt to Regulate the Industry 
Of the two options noted above, the SEC chose the latter 
and never appealed to the Supreme Court. In fact, the SEC 
abandoned the entire effort to register hedge funds through the 
Investment Advisers Act. Instead, the SEC quickly attempted 
to bring new regulatory action to the hedge fund industry with 
a pair of proposals released on January 4, 2007,89 just over six 
months after the Goldstein decision. The first of the proposals, 
the anti-fraud rules, went into effect on September 10, 2007.90 
The anti-fraud rules consist of two additional anti-fraud 
provisions to the Advisers Act.91 The new anti-fraud rules 
enhance the existing anti-fraud provisions of the Advisers Act, 
which prohibit fraudulent conduct by the advisor against the 
fund, by explicitly prohibiting fraudulent conduct by the 
advisor against individual investors in the fund.92 Specifically, 
the new rules prohibit two types of conduct. First, advisors are 
prohibited from making untrue or fraudulent statements to 
investors or prospective investors in a fund, regardless of the 
intent behind the statements.93 Second, advisors are prohibited 
from “[o]therwise engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of 
business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative with 
  
stating that the change would not be “any more rational when viewed in light of the 
policy goals underlying the Advisers Act.” Id. at 883. 
 88 Id. at 883. 
 89 See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (Jan. 4, 
2007). The quick turnaround by the SEC in creating new regulations further exhibits 
the SEC’s focus on regulating the hedge fund industry. 
 90 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2008). 
 91 Id. In the release accompanying the proposal the SEC cited the Advisers 
Act as delegating power to the SEC to create rules and regulations to prevent fraud. 
Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 401; see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-6(4) (2006) (“The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph . . . by 
rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such 
acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”). 
 92 See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 401-03. 
 93 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4); see also Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 
Fed. Reg. at 403. 
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respect to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled 
investment vehicle.”94 These combined regulations are inten-
tionally broad, allowing the SEC to prosecute anything that it 
later deems to be “deceptive conduct.”95 
The second change that the SEC proposed in December 
2006 is a change to the level of requirement in order to be 
exempted under the Securities Act. Most hedge funds avoid 
registration under the Securities Act by use of Regulation D, 
which exempts certain offers and sales.96 Regulation D allows 
funds to avoid registration if they allow investment only from 
accredited investors—those that have at least $1,000,000 in net 
worth or income of $200,000 (or $300,000 jointly).97 Under this 
proposal the SEC sought to force a two-part test for 
exemption.98 First, the investor would have had to meet the 
current definition of an “accredited investor.” Second, the 
investor would have needed $2.5 million in investments in 
addition to being an “accredited investor.”99 As a result, an 
investor who would have been able to invest in hedge funds 
based on his $200,000 salary would be shut out unless he had 
$2.5 million in saved capital. Both the new requirement of $2.5 
million in investments and the already established income 
levels would not be stagnant, but would be adjusted for 
inflation beginning in 2012 and would continue to adjust every 
five years thereafter.100 The definition of “investments” under 
Regulation D would also be changed to specifically exclude a 
person’s residence or place of business or “real estate held in 
connection with a trade or business.”101 Hedge funds would be 
the only target for this new requirement, as the SEC in its 
proposal expressly excluded venture capital funds.102 The SEC’s 
rationale for the exclusion of venture capital funds was based 
on the belief that venture capital funds are necessary to help 
small businesses.103 
  
 94 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8. 
 95 Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 403. 
 96 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007). As of March 2008, there have not been any 
changes to Regulation D on the basis of any of the proposals. 
 97 See id. § 230.501(a). 
 98 August 2007 Revision, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116, 45,127 (Aug. 10, 2007). 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 406. 
 101 Id. at 407. 
 102 Id. at 407-08. 
 103 Id. 
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After the SEC published its proposal, it extended the 
usual comment period.104 A strong showing of displeasure with 
the SEC’s new definition ultimately led the Commission to 
revise the proposal’s $2.5 million requirement.105 The revised 
proposal, released in August 2007, eliminated the two-step 
test.106 The revised proposal retains the accredited investor test 
at the existing threshold amounts, but provides in the 
alternative that an investor with $750,000 in investments also 
qualifies as an accredited investor.107 
However, remaining in place from the Accredited 
Investor Proposal are two extremely potent changes. First, 
personal real estate and the value of a place of business are 
excluded from the calculation of an investment for use in 
qualifying as an “accredited investor.”108 Investors that had a 
high net worth as a result of a property they owned would be 
excluded from investing in hedge funds. Second, the dollar 
amounts applicable to all of these exemptions would be 
adjusted in July 2012 for inflation occurring since 1982, the 
year the income levels were established, and would continue to 
adjust every five years thereafter.109 The effect of the August 
2007 revised proposal is that the changes will be made quietly, 
five years later when the inflation adjustment hits. This 
change cannot be underestimated. Although the current 
income requirement for a single person is $200,000 that figure 
adjusted for inflation is $442,545.08 in 2008 dollars.110 By 
extrapolating that five more years, it is likely that in 2012 the 
required net income to become an accredited investor will be 
over $500,000, which is $300,000 more than it is today. 
Thus, the Hedge Fund Rule sought to force hedge fund 
managers to register by changing the way a term was defined 
in the Advisers Act. This rule was vacated by Goldstein.111 In its 
place, the SEC devised two sets of changes to the regulations to 
  
 104 A comment period follows the release of a proposed rule to afford the public 
a chance to express its views on the merits of the proposal. SEC, How to Submit 
Comments on SEC Rulemaking, http://sec.gov/rules/submitcomments.htm (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2008). 
 105 August 2007 Revision, 72 Fed. Reg. at 45,123, 45,127. 
 106 Id. at 45,123. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 45,124. 
 109 Id. at 45,126. 
 110 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Apr. 17, 2008). The calculator uses the rise in the consumer 
price index to adjust for inflation. 
 111 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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the Securities Act. The first set, the anti-fraud provisions, seek 
to allow the SEC to prosecute fraud by hedge funds both in 
their offering documents and in their conduct. This has been 
adopted by the SEC and is now a part of the regulations under 
the Securities Act.112 The second set of proposals, first released 
in December 2006 and then changed in August 2007, seek to 
change the level of money that an investor must have in order 
to invest in hedge funds. As it stands after the August 2007 
revised proposal, the original levels remain in place.113 If the 
proposal was adopted, however, the levels would change in 
2012 to reflect inflation from 1982 dollars. This is likely to have 
a significant effect on hedge funds and investors, limiting the 
amount of available investment dollars to hedge funds as well 
as the number of investors eligible to invest.  
IV. THE HEDGE FUND RULE AND THE CURRENT PROPOSAL: 
TWO RULES, NO DIRECTION 
The SEC has made two attempts in the past several 
years to insert itself into the hedge fund industry—through the 
Hedge Fund Rule as well as the December 2006 proposals. This 
section of the Note will demonstrate how the SEC’s almost 
singular interest in regulating the hedge fund industry has led 
it to create regulations that are either unnecessary or that do 
not properly address the original concerns that the SEC cites. 
Part A will address the SEC’s first concern, which the SEC 
articulated in the Hedge Fund Rule release, that hedge funds 
have grown by a tremendous rate in recent years.114 Part B will 
discuss the SEC’s concern regarding a number of hedge fund 
fraud cases brought by the enforcement division of the SEC.115 
Part C will address the third concern: that small investors are 
opening themselves up to the risks taken by hedge funds 
through their investment in pension funds and “funds of 
funds.” Finally, Part D will illustrate the inconsistencies 
between the Hedge Fund Rule and the recent rules, further 
demonstrating the SEC’s fixation on regulating hedge funds 
without regard for the consistency of its approach. 
  
 112 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2008); see also supra text accompanying notes 
90-95. 
 113 See supra text accompanying note 106-109. 
 114 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,054-56 (Dec. 10, 2004). 
 115 Id. at 72,056-57. 
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A.  Hedge Fund Growth: Cause for Concern or a Natural 
Expansion? 
The SEC expressed concern in the release accompany-
ing the Hedge Fund Rule regarding the growing rise in hedge 
fund assets and the rapid expansion in the number of funds.116 
The Hedge Fund Rule estimated that there were $870 billion 
managed by approximately 7000 funds.117 Highlighting the 
growth of the industry, the SEC demonstrated that between 
1999 and 2004 hedge funds had grown by 260%, nearly 
becoming a $1 trillion business.118 Although the rise in hedge 
funds has not been completely uphill, due in part to the weak 
credit market beginning in late 2007,119 assets managed by the 
largest of hedge funds in 2007 were still over $1.6 trillion, a 
34% increase over 2006.120 Hedge funds have undoubtedly 
become a huge part of the marketplace, and by some indica-
tions they amount to the equivalent of 10% of the value of the 
entire New York Stock Exchange.121 
The SEC cited the enormous growth of hedge funds as a 
basis for creating the Hedge Fund Rule, yet it never actually 
  
 116 Id. at 72,055-56. 
 117 Id. at 72,055. 
 118 Id. at 72,055-56 (“What is remarkable is the growth of the hedge funds. In 
the last five years alone, hedge fund assets have grown 260 percent, and in the last 
year, hedge fund assets have grown over 30 percent. Some predict the amount of hedge 
fund assets will exceed $1 trillion by the end of the year. Hedge fund assets are 
growing faster than mutual fund assets and already equal just over one fifth of the 
assets of mutual funds that invest in equity securities.”). 
 119 See Natali, supra note 19, at 125-26; see also Aaron Pressman, Hedge 
Funds: The Pool Is Shrinking, BUS. WK., Jan. 19, 2006, at 32. There has been a 
tremendous amount of discussion about hedge funds and their Cinderella rise. The 
credit crisis has taken its toll on many hedge funds including some from household 
name investment banks, see Finalternative.com, Bear to Close Third Hedge Fund After 
40% Decline (Jan. 10, 2008), available at http://www.finalternatives.com/node/3246. In 
evaluating the rise in hedge funds and some of their recent declines, it is important to 
bear in mind that hedge funds are not a single market, akin to the stock market, but 
are individually managed by independent advisors who make decisions as to what to 
invest in. See Natali, supra, at 116. If a manager is considered successful over a period 
of time then investors will be attracted to the fund. If a fund suffers heavy losses then 
investors will seek to withdraw their money from that fund and find a fund with a 
better track record. During the credit crisis in 2007-2008, some hedge funds bore losses 
due to a “run on the fund.” This was not limited to hedge funds, but in fact was a 
phenomenon that caused the demise of one of the oldest of brokerage houses, Bear 
Stearns, in March 2008. See Landon Thomas Jr., Aftershocks of a Collapse, with a 
Bank at the Epicenter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008. 
 120 Press Release, Hedgefundintelligence.com, Top Hedge Fund Assets 
Surpass $1.6 Trillion According to Absolute Return Survey (Mar. 4, 2008). 
 121 Kevin G. Hall & Robert A. Rankin, Hedge Funds May Pose a Risk to U.S. 
Economy, MCCLATCHY, Aug. 8, 2007, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/18766.html. 
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defined the “problem.”122 In contrast, the Accredited Investor 
Proposal and the anti-fraud rules never mention the extreme 
growth of hedge funds as a reason for concern. In the Hedge 
Fund Rule release, the SEC detailed the growing size of funds, 
but failed to connect that to a concern that warrants the 
further regulation of hedge funds.123 In fact, the SEC, after 
listing a host of statistics regarding hedge fund growth, stated 
that “[a]s a result, hedge fund advisors have become significant 
participants in the securities markets.”124 This basically ended 
the section regarding this problem, leaving the reader to 
wonder why the fact that hedge funds are market players is a 
logical basis for changing regulatory rules. Former Chairman 
of the SEC, William Donaldson, expressed similarly vague 
concerns about the growth of hedge funds in April of 2003 when 
he testified before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs, and began lobbying on behalf of the 2004 
Hedge Fund Rule.125 Donaldson called for an investigation into 
“market impact issues” stemming from hedge funds and 
maintained that it “may be that there are other, more subtle or 
nuanced results of hedge fund activity that merit attention.”126 
Creating regulations to deal with unknown problems is akin to 
hunting in the dark: you never know what you may hit. 
One plausible concern that the SEC might have is that 
the larger the hedge funds are, the harder they could fall.127 
This concern is borne out of the near failure of Long Term 
  
 122 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,055-56. 72,054 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Donaldson, supra note 17. 
 126 Id. at 9. William Donaldson has been the chairman of the SEC board of 
commissioners since 2003. SEC, SEC Biography: Chairman William H. Donaldson, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/donaldson.htm (last visited January 23, 2008). 
Since taking over the helm of the SEC, Donaldson has spearheaded the campaign  
to regulate the hedge fund industry. He has introduced three separate regulations  
that target the industry: the Hedge Fund Rule, the anti-fraud rules, and the Accredited 
Investor Proposal. Perhaps not coincidently, he became chairman and began his push 
to regulate hedge funds shortly after a number of scandals rocked the financial 
markets, including the great Enron collapse and the fallout from it. Id. Although 
President George W. Bush appointed Donaldson as chairman of the SEC, see Press 
Release, President Bush Announced His Intention to Nominate William Donaldson  
to be Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 10, 2002), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021210-9.html, he has 
disagreed with Donaldson’s targeting of hedge funds for further regulation. See 
Stephen Labaton, Officials Reject More Oversight of Hedge Funds, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/23/business/web-0223hedge.php. 
 127 See Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and 
Stock Market Volatility—What Regulation by the Securities Exchange Commission is 
Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 945 (2005). 
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Capital Management (“LTCM”).128 LTCM was a hedge fund that 
started in 1994 with $1.25 billion in capital.129 The fund quickly 
amassed $102 billion in assets, almost completely in borrowed 
funds, as the equity in the fund was only $3.6 billion.130 In late 
1998, after a series of crippling losses for the fund, the fund 
was left with between $1.75 to $1.85 billion in equity, but over 
$100 billion in debt.131 In other words, LTCM was dangerously 
overleveraged132 and heading to a failure that would cause 
catastrophic market tremors.133 Consequently, the Federal 
Reserve was forced to put together a syndicate of leading 
investment banks who agreed to invest $3.65 billion of capital 
in exchange for 90% of the shares of LTCM.134 Following the 
near collapse, LTCM was able to recover and regain profit-
ability.135 This Note assumes that the SEC fears that the risks 
taken by hedge funds could cause a collapse like the one 
narrowly avoided by LTCM. An assumption about the nature of 
the risk is necessary because although the Hedge Fund Rule 
cites the growth of hedge funds as requiring regulation, it fails 
to explicitly state what specific risk this growth poses.136 The 
SEC presumably believes that the growth of the hedge fund 
  
 128 See Matthew Goldstein, Note, A Secret Society: Hedge Funds and Their 
Mysterious Success, 6 HOFSTRA J. OF INT’L BUS. & L. 111, 118 (2007). 
 129 See Justin Asbury Dillmore, Leap Before You Look: The SEC’s Approach to 
Hedge Fund Regulation, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 169, 170 (2006). 
 130 See id. at 171. LTCM’s debt was approximately $98.4 billion, while the 
fund’s equity was $3.6 billion. Id. The ratio of debt to fund equity in LTCM was 27.33. 
A ratio of 1 or less would mean that the fund only borrows against the amount of its 
equity. The 27.33 figure signifies significant risk because the fund could not sustain 
itself if its value dropped and some of the debt would be called by the lenders. Consider 
the example of purchasing items on a credit card. Using the card only to the extent that 
the cardholder has money in a bank account to cover the charges would keep the 
debt/equity ratio under 1. Spending twenty-seven times the amount in the account in a 
month would be similar to LTCM’s position. 
 131 Id. at 171-72. 
 132 Leverage is defined as “the amount of debt used to finance a firms assets.” 
Investopedia, Leverage, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2008). The amount of leverage that a fund employs is an important indicator 
of its health. If it has only a small amount of equity (the money actually invested in the 
fund) and a high amount of debt and the fund starts to decrease in value, it may 
become impossible for it to continue to finance its debt, which often leads to a further 
decrease in fund value as investors become concerned that about its financial health. 
 133 See Dillmore, supra note 129, at 172. 
 134 Id. at 173. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,055-56 (Dec. 10, 
2004). Although the release accompanying the Hedge Fund Rule is over 100 pages long, 
the discussion regarding the risk posed by the growth of hedge funds is a single 
paragraph. Id. 
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industry creates risks that could lead to larger market ripples 
if hedge funds collapse, thus making regulation necessary. 
Although a risk to the general markets caused by the 
increasing growth of hedge funds is a legitimate SEC concern,137 
the Hedge Fund Rule and the anti-fraud rules, as well as the 
Accredited Investor Proposal and August 2007 revision, all fail 
to address the risk caused to the market by hedge funds. The 
Hedge Fund Rule forced hedge funds advisors to register under 
the Advisers Act.138 The requirement to register would have 
subjected the funds to examination by the SEC.139 This includes 
enforcement agents reviewing the procedures for valuing client 
assets, procedures for placing trades, arranging for custody of 
client funds and securities, and the full disclosure of any 
conflict of interests.140 The SEC would not have been privy to 
the actual positions of the hedge funds and would not have had 
any say over the strategy that the hedge fund employs.141 The 
  
 137 See Karmel, supra note 127, at 945. Professor Karmel gives a more 
detailed background to the LTCM’s near collapse. The focus of the article is on the 
risks to the general market that stem from positions and trading strategies of hedge 
funds, mutual funds, and pension funds. The article is broad and devotes a small 
section to examining the risks that arise from hedge funds. Id. at 934-35. Part of the 
problem of examining the risks that hedge funds pose is that there is a lack of 
empirical evidence showing how the collapsing of hedge funds has affected the broader 
markets. Although some articles address this potential threat, they almost exclusively 
use LTCM as their example of hedge funds’ detrimental effects on broader markets. 
See, e.g., Dustin G. Hall, Note, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in 
Our Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 185 (2008). This is likely a result of a lack 
of other examples of spectacular hedge fund collapses that have led to broader market 
ripples. Although the LTCM episode is telling, a single example is not enough to tell 
the whole story. Contrary to the belief that hedge funds have a purely negative impact 
on the broader markets, Paul F. Roye, former Director of the Division of Investment 
Management at the SEC, in a speech at a hedge fund conference extolled the value that 
hedge funds provide the general markets in the way of liquidity and efficiency. See 
Paul F. Roye, Speech by SEC Staff: General Session Speaker at the SIA Hedge Funds 
Conference: New Regulation: Weighing the Impact (Nov. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch113004pfr.htm. The debate about the potential 
fallout from hedge fund collapses will probably continue until there is more empirical 
evidence gleaned from hedge fund collapses and their effects on the general markets. 
 138 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,060. 
 139 Id. at 72,061. 
 140 Id. at 72,061 n.85 (“During an examination, our staff may review the 
advisory firm’s internal controls and procedures; they may examine the adequacy of 
procedures for valuing client assets, for placing and allocating trades, and for 
arranging for custody of client funds and securities. Examination staff also may review 
the advisor’s performance claims and delivery of its client disclosure brochure. Each of 
these operational areas presents a greater opportunity for misconduct if it is not open 
to examination.”). 
 141 Id. at 72,060 n.68 (“Nor does the Act restrict the ability of advisers to 
engage in short-selling. Moreover, nothing in the Act or our rules requires any 
investment adviser to disclose its securities positions. Indeed, we recently declined 
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SEC, therefore, would have lacked the necessary ability to act 
upon the risks taken by the funds,142 including how much 
leverage a fund could employ.143 Thus, the SEC would be unable 
to prevent the same type of problem that caused the near 
collapse of LTCM. Moreover, the recently enacted anti-fraud 
rules do not give the SEC a say in hedge fund strategies or 
investments, as they focus solely on fraud.144 Finally, the 
Accredited Investor Proposal to raise the accredited investor 
standard seeks only to change the threshold of who can invest 
in hedge funds, not what hedge funds can invest in.145 
In addition, the releases accompanying both the anti-
fraud rules and the Accredited Investor Proposal completely 
ignore the concern of hedge fund growth that the Hedge Fund 
Rule addressed, as they do not even list it as a reason to 
regulate.146 Neither of them ameliorates the risks that the 
funds take, which the SEC considered so important when it 
formulated the Hedge Fund Rule. Thus, the SEC is creating 
rules that are inconsistent with the problems it sees in the 
hedge fund industry. 
B.  Hedge Fund Fraud: Never a Good Thing, But Worthy  
of Regulation? 
The SEC cited a “substantial and troubling growth in 
the number of . . . hedge fund fraud enforcement cases” as one 
of the reasons for implementing the Hedge Fund Rule.147 The 
agency pointed to fifty-one cases of hedge fund fraud in the 
  
requests to require advisers to publicly disclose how they voted client proxies out of a 
concern that they would thereby divulge client securities positions.”). 
 142 Id. at 72,061-63. 
 143 Although leverage is an increased risk, it is also one of the ways that a 
hedge fund can increase its profit. Borrowing money against capital invested in the 
fund allows the fund managers to take larger positions in investments, thereby 
increasing the possible return. A very simplified example of how leverage can increase 
return is borrowing money to bet on a horse race. If an investor has $10 and borrows 
$90, the total bet will be $100. If the investor wins, and it was a 10 for 1 payout, the 
investor walks away with $910, the $1000 won less the $90 loan (less the interest on 
the loan, which can vary). Compare this to betting only the $10 that the investor has on 
the horse, and a win will only garnish a total of $100. Of course if the investor borrows 
the $90 and loses, then he will have to pay the $90 back, in addition to the $10 of his 
own money that is lost. This example demonstrates the risk that is inherent in 
leverage, yet also the possible reward. 
 144 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2008). 
 145 See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 400 (Jan. 4, 
2007). 
 146 See supra text accompanying notes 122-125. 
 147 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,056. 
2008] THE HEDGE FUND HOLDUP 1531 
five-year period ending in 2004.148 Additionally, the SEC made 
much of the fact that several hedge funds were deeply involved 
in the 2003 market-timing scandal involving mutual funds149 
and noted that the SEC was continuing to bring enforcement 
actions.150 This type of suspicious activity provided an impetus 
not only for the Hedge Fund Rule, but also for the recently 
implemented anti-fraud rules.151 
Although there have been several instances of fraud in 
the hedge fund industry, it is not apparent that the Hedge 
Fund Rule could have prevented a substantial number of the 
fraudulent acts.152 This argument was made by SEC Commis-
sioner Paul Atkins at a meeting in 2004 discussing the Hedge 
Fund Rule.153 Atkins broke down all of the hedge fund fraud 
cases and concluded that registration under the Hedge Fund 
Rule would have prevented a total of twenty-six cases of fraud 
in an industry with, at the time, over 7000 funds.154 Out of the 
original forty-six cases of fraud that the SEC cited as a basis 
for the implementation of the Hedge Fund Rule, eight of the 
funds were previously registered with the SEC, while twenty of 
them were too small to be covered by the registration rule.155 
Many of the other cases involved the fraudulent valuation of 
funds, something that has been traditionally difficult to detect, 
even in a registered fund.156 Although the rule’s effect on 
preventing fraud is debatable, the fact that the SEC was going 
forward with a proposal that would affect over 7000 hedge 
funds on the basis of several cases undermines the SEC’s push 
to act. This effort’s limited utility in eliminating fraud is 
further demonstrated by the SEC’s acknowledgment that only 
  
 148 Id. 
 149 The market-timing scandal involved mutual fund managers profiting from 
short-term market moves. ICI.org, Questions and Answers About the Mutual Fund 
Investigations, http://www.ici.org/funds/abt/faqs_timing.html (last visited Mar. 20, 
2008). Although market timing itself is not illegal, mutual funds discourage it as it 
disrupts the price of the funds. Id. Much of the scandal focused on certain funds’ 
selective enforcement of market timing, allowing some managers to escape inquiry 
while others received a penalty for their actions. Id. 
 150 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,056 n.29. 
 151 See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 401-02. 
 152 Paul S. Atkins, Statement by SEC Commissioner at Open Meeting 
Considering Proposed Regulation Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund 
Advisors, (July 14, 2004), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch071404psa.htm. 
 153 Id. Atkins was publicly critical of the Hedge Fund Rule, and voted against 
it when it was brought before the commission. Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See Dillmore, supra note 129, at 183. 
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about half of the funds involved in the fraud cases would have 
been forced to register under the new rule.157 The agency 
nevertheless supported its position by stating that the number 
of fraud cases indicates an increase in overall hedge fund 
fraud.158 Thus, the SEC’s implementation of the Hedge Fund 
Rule illustrates how the SEC is trying to regulate the hedge 
fund industry regardless of both the size of the problem and the 
effectiveness of its proposed solution. 
Under the anti-fraud rules, hedge funds are strictly 
liable for fraud,159 evidencing the SEC’s interest in creating a 
regulatory system that targets hedge funds. The recently 
approved anti-fraud rules prohibit the dissemination of untrue 
or fraudulent information by hedge fund advisors to their 
investors.160 It also implements a broad anti-fraudulent conduct 
provision.161 It appears that the SEC is so eager to have a regu-
latory role in hedge funds that it has created the rules with a 
negligence standard,162 abandoning the scienter standard that 
is used in other anti-fraud provisions.163 The scienter standard 
has been interpreted to require at a minimum knowledge of the 
wrongdoing, if not an always an intent to deceive.164 With the 
  
 157 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,056 n.28 (Dec. 10, 2004). 
 158 Id. (“[R]egardless of whether any particular adviser would be required to 
register with us, these cases demonstrate the increased prevalence of fraud associated 
with hedge funds.”). 
 159 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2008). It is a violation under the anti-fraud 
rules to “[m]ake any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary to make the statements made . . . to any investor or prospective investor 
in the pooled investment vehicle.” Id. 
 160 Id.; see also Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 402 
(Jan. 4, 2007). 
 161 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (covering not only advisor misrepresentations 
and deceptive omissions, but also “any act, practice, or course of business that is 
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective 
investor in the pooled investment vehicle”); see also Fraud & Accredited Investor 
Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 403. 
 162 Under the anti-fraud provisions, all untrue information that is 
disseminated to an investor is subject to prosecution, even if the advisor was unaware 
of the inaccuracy. This is a negligence standard under which advisor intent is 
irrelevant. See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 403. 
 163 Scienter is required for a violation of Rule 10b-5, the SEC’s regulation 
banning insider trading. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). Scienter is defined in the 
10b-5 context by the Supreme Court as requiring an “intent to deceive, manipulate or 
defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.7 (1976). Rule 10b-5 has 
such widespread implications and has such notoriety that there are even websites 
dedicated to the rule. See The 10b-5 Daily Home Page, http://www.the10b-5daily.com 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
 164 See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 403; see also 
WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 690 (2d ed. 2007). 
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current formulation of the rule, the SEC need only show that 
there was some untrue statement in the offering documents; 
something as trivial as mislabeling an advisor’s address would 
be actionable under the current setup of the rule.165 Accord-
ingly, the SEC has shown it intends to break into the relative 
free reign of hedge funds, creating an intentionally overbroad 
rule. 
The SEC has exaggerated the claim that concerns for 
fraud necessitate new regulations. More importantly, the rules 
that the SEC has created to deal with the fraud are either 
ineffective in the case of the Hedge Fund Rule, or are so 
overbroad as to find many hedge fund advisors, even those that 
are merely negligent, in the SEC’s regulatory crosshairs. 
C. Institutional Investors: The Institution Protects Itself 
When releasing the Hedge Fund Rule, the SEC stated 
that its greatest motivation was the fear that small investors 
would open themselves up to the large risks that hedge funds 
take by way of the small investors investing indirectly in hedge 
funds. Specifically, the SEC pointed to two different ways that 
small investors were indirectly becoming hedge fund investors. 
First, the SEC in the Hedge Fund Rule attached the greatest 
significance to the growing number of pension funds,166 endow-
ments, and charities that invest in hedge funds like never 
before.167 Fearing massive losses to pension funds as a result of 
losses in hedge funds, the SEC was concerned that pension 
beneficiaries would lose their entitlements.168 Second, a pheno-
menon known as “funds of hedge funds,” which are funds that 
invest in multiple hedge funds to reduce risk,169 was becoming 
  
 165 See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 402-03. 
 166 See Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,057-58 (Dec. 10, 
2004). Pension funds are retirement vehicles in which employers contribute to a fund 
to benefit employee retirement. There are many variations of pension plans, some are 
fully funded by the employer while others also allow employees to decide to contribute 
a percentage of their paycheck. Citibank.com, Investment Center Glossary: Defined 
Contribution Plans, http://www.citibank.com/bahrain/gcb/invest/glossary.htm (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2008). Many Americans rely on their pension plans to supplement 
their social security retirement benefits. 
 167 See Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,057-58. 
 168 Id. 
 169 JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, HEDGE FUND OF FUNDS INVESTING 6 (2004). “Funds 
of funds” are an important part of the hedge fund industry. As of 2004, funds of  
funds represented one third of all of the assets invested in hedge funds. Id. at 3-4. As  
of April 2007, fund of funds controlled $684 billion in assets worldwide. Hedge Funds 
Record Inflows of USD 60 Billion in Q1 2007, Nearly 300 Per Cent Gain over Q4  
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the investment choice for many small investors.170 Each of these 
investment vehicles will be examined for both its validity as a 
threat to small investors and whether the regulations offered 
by the SEC effectively protect small investors. 
The SEC cited the investment of small investors in 
pension funds as a basis for the Hedge Fund Rule, but this 
overlooks the fact that pension funds are inherently protected 
by the pension fund managers. In the Hedge Fund Rule, the 
SEC stated that the rise in the number of pension funds that 
were investing in hedge funds was perhaps the most significant 
reason to create more reporting requirements for hedge 
funds.171 Pension fund managers who invest in hedge funds, 
however, are likely to invest in conservative hedge funds, 
aware of their responsibilities to investors. This is supported by 
practices taken by hedge funds that seek to attract pension 
funds. Those hedge funds that seek pension funds as investors 
have taken steps to register themselves voluntarily and have 
put more internal compliance controls into place in order to 
attract pension fund managers.172 This is due to the nature  
of pension funds, a historically risk-averse segment of the 
market.173 Even assuming that pension funds significantly 
increase their risk by investing in hedge funds, pension fund 
managers are hired by investors to manage those risks and to 
formulate plans that balance overall investment risks.174 The 
argument that pension fund managers are sophisticated and 
that accordingly their investors do not need protection is hardly 
  
2006, HEDGEWEEK, Apr. 23, 2007, available at http://www.hedgeweek.com/articles/ 
detail.jsp?content_id=95061 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 170 See Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,057. 
 171 See id. at 72,057-58 (“Finally, and perhaps most significantly, in the last 
few years, a growing number of public and private pension funds, as well as 
universities, endowments, foundations, and other charitable organizations, have begun 
to invest in hedge funds or have increased their allocations to hedge funds.”). 
 172 See Wang Fangquing, Regulators and Investors a One-Two Compliance 
Punch, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2007. 
 173 See Riva D. Atlas & Mary Williams Walsh, Pension Officers Putting 
Billions into Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005. It is important to remember that 
not all hedge funds are alike. Although many hedge funds take large risks, the SEC 
has categorized all hedge funds as high risk, ignoring funds that adhere to the 
“hedging” principle of lowering investor risk. 
 174 Russel Read, chief investment officer of the California Public Employees 
Retirement System, a pension fund that holds $225 billion in retirement assets, 
decided not to invest in hedge funds because he felt that the enormous fees that they 
charged did not justify returns that he felt he could mimic. David Clarke, Hedge Funds 
Charge Too Much for Returns, Calpers Says (Update 1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 9, 2007. 
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a novel one.175 It bears repeating, however, because the SEC’s 
failure to account for the choices made by professional pension 
fund managers is further evidence that the SEC is intent on 
regulating even where regulation is unnecessary. 
Even if a pension fund investing in hedge funds poses a 
risk to beneficiaries, the Hedge Fund Rule would have failed to 
remedy the problem of beneficiaries losing benefits due to a 
hedge fund collapse. Although hedge fund fraud could cause 
the collapse of a fund,176 much of the purported risk to hedge 
fund investors comes from the trading strategy and positions 
that hedge funds take. The SEC would not have had any 
knowledge of or control over these areas.177 The Hedge Fund 
Rule governed only the reporting of practices that hedge funds 
employ with regard to their books and investors, not the 
positions that hedge funds take.178 The Hedge Fund Rule, 
therefore, would not have corrected the problem that the SEC 
claimed existed. 
Furthermore, the SEC was inconsistent when it later  
discounted the threat to pension funds that hedge funds pose in 
its discussion in the Accredited Investor Proposal release.179 In 
the Accredited Investor Proposal, the SEC stated that pension 
funds that invest in hedge funds are protected by their pension 
managers.180 According to the SEC, pension fund investors do 
not need protection.181 Did the risk to pension fund investors 
evaporate in the six months between the vacating of the Hedge 
  
 175 See Jacob Preiserowicz, The New Regulatory Regime for Hedge Funds: Has 
the SEC Gone Down the Wrong Path?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 807, 840-41 
(2006) (noting the position of the SEC’s commissioners opposing the Hedge Fund Rule). 
 176 Hedge Fund Founder Admits Guilt in Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006 
(discussing the collapse of the Bayou hedge fund due to fraud on the part of its founder 
and two other top officers). 
 177 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,060 n.68 (“Nor does the Act 
restrict the ability of advisers to engage in short-selling. Moreover, nothing in the Act 
or our rules requires any investment adviser to disclose its securities positions. Indeed, 
we recently declined requests to require advisers to publicly disclose how they voted 
client proxies out of a concern that they would thereby divulge client securities 
positions.”); see also supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text. 
 178 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,060. 
 179 See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 404 (Jan. 4, 
2007). 
 180 Id. (“We note that natural persons may have indirect exposure to private 
pools as a result of their participation in pension plans and investment in certain 
pooled investment vehicles that invest in private pools. Such plans and vehicles are 
generally administered by entities of plan fiduciaries and registered investment 
professionals. This protection is not present in the case of natural persons who seek to 
invest in 3(c)(1) Pools outside of the structure of such pension plans and pooled 
investment vehicles.”). 
 181 Id. 
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Fund Rule by the D.C. Circuit and the Accredited Investor 
Proposal? The SEC has once again been inconsistent in its 
treatment of the problems it claims exist. 
In addition to the concern about pension fund investors, 
fear that investors would have more opportunity to invest 
through funds of hedge funds led the SEC to implement the 
Hedge Fund Rule. “Funds of funds,” as they are commonly 
known, are companies that invest in a diversified range of 
hedge funds. Their main benefit to investors is the opportunity 
to diversify risk by having the fund itself invest in several 
different hedge funds.182 The SEC pointed to the growing 
number of funds of funds that small investors are investing 
in.183 In reality, funds of funds have generally been intent on 
attracting institutional clients, rather than small investors.184 
In fact, institutional investors make up a consistently high 
percentage of funds of funds’ assets.185 Even if funds of funds 
were attracting “small investors,” this is a phenomenon that 
the SEC should be encouraging, not attempting to prevent. 
Funds of funds are run by professional investment managers 
who choose to invest in hedge funds.186 This professional 
management is very beneficial to a small investor, allowing  
the investor to diversify risk among hedge funds.187 Although  
the SEC has made it seem that hedge funds themselves bear 
incredible risks, many funds of funds, especially the smaller 
ones, have styled themselves toward the institutional investor 
who is looking to minimize risk.188 This concern of the SEC 
seems to be based on an almost irrational fear: stop small 
investors from getting involved in hedge funds even if they use 
a vehicle that is created to limit risk. 
  
 182 NICHOLAS, supra note 169, at 4. 
 183 See Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,057 n.35. 
 184 Christine Williamson, Hedge Funds of Funds: Institutions Lead the Way, 
PENSION & INV., Sept. 17, 2007, available at http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20070917/PRINTSUB/70914002. 
 185 Id. 
 186 NICHOLAS, supra note 169, at 64. 
 187 Id. (“The low investment size, professional portfolio management, and 
investment diversification afforded by funds of funds are benefits superior to what a 
small or medium-sized investor could achieve on its own.”). 
 188 Williamson, supra note 184. 
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D. The Hedge Fund Rule and the Recent Rules: Two Faces, 
One Agency 
There are inconsistencies between the Hedge Fund Rule 
and the Accredited Investor Proposal that the SEC has 
promulgated. This further illustrates that the SEC is so intent 
on creating more regulation for the hedge fund industry that  
it has contradicted itself. In the Accredited Investor Proposal,  
the SEC sought to change the level of required capital to 
become an “accredited investor.”189 In the Hedge Fund Rule 
release, which took place prior to the Accredited Investor 
Proposal, the SEC downplayed the effectiveness of changing 
the accredited investor standard. The SEC believed that 
raising the accredited investor standard would not prevent 
small investors investing in hedge funds because they could 
still invest indirectly in hedge funds through pension funds.190 
Yet once the Hedge Fund Rule was struck down, the SEC 
introduced this precise change merely six months later.191 This 
inconsistency of approach is evidence of the SEC’s blatant 
attempt to further regulate the hedge fund industry, even if  
it has to contradict itself. 
In addition to the inconsistency between the rules, the 
SEC’s Accredited Investor Proposal is arbitrary and targets the 
hedge fund industry while exempting other investment options. 
In the December 2006 release, the SEC juxtaposed the 
percentage of all investors able to invest in hedge funds under 
the old accredited investor standard against the percentage of 
investors who would be eligible under the Accredited Investor 
Proposal.192 The SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis estimated 
that in 1982 when the accredited investor standard was put 
  
 189 Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 400 (Jan. 4, 
2007). 
 190 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,064 (Dec. 10, 2004) 
(“Raising the accredited investor standards would not address the broader concerns, 
discussed above, of the indirect exposure to hedge funds by an increasingly large 
number of persons who are beneficiaries of pension plans . . . .”). 
 191 See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (Jan. 4, 
2007). 
 192 See id. at 72 Fed. Reg. at 406. In August 2007, the SEC released a revision 
to its original proposal in which it left the accredited investor standard at the original 
levels, with the caveat that the rates would be raised in 2012 to reflect inflation since 
1982, the year that the original levels were established. See August 2007 Revision, 72 
Fed. Reg. 45,116, 45,123-26 (Aug. 10, 2007). Regardless of this revision, the argument 
here is centered on the actions that the SEC is taking and its ultimate goals. This goes 
beyond the pure percentages and requirement level, but focuses on a pattern that the 
SEC has taken since the introduction of the Hedge Fund Rule. 
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into place, 1.87% of the U.S. population qualified as accredited 
investors able to invest in hedge funds.193 As of 2003, 8.47% 
were eligible—a significant rise, due in part to general inflation 
and also to the increase in real estate values over that period.194 
This means that an investor who had property that increased 
in value over the years would become eligible for accreditation, 
even if the investor’s income level remained the same. Under 
the December 2006 proposed levels, only 1.3% of the popula-
tion, less than the original 1982 level, would be eligible to 
become an accredited investor.195  
The SEC offered justification for establishing an all-
time low percentage of the population eligible to invest in 
hedge funds because of the “increasing complexity of financial 
products, in general, and hedge funds, in particular, over the 
last decade.”196 There are two flaws with this rationale. First, 
the SEC did not explain how it arrived at 1.3% of the 
population as its target.197 If the SEC was looking to create an 
all-time low, it could have picked 1.5% or 1%, both of which are 
below the 1982 level. This is another instance where the SEC is 
arbitrarily regulating the hedge fund industry and is clearly 
ignoring the parting shot of the D.C. Circuit’s repudiation of 
the Hedge Fund Rule: “This is an arbitrary rule.”198 Second, the 
SEC is looking at only the hedge fund side of the equation. 
Even given the increased complexity of hedge funds, the SEC 
ignored the substantial increase in accessibility of investment 
information since 1982. For example, the Internet offers a 
plethora of investment information that was unavailable to the 
average American twenty-six years ago.199 By taking into 
account only the increased sophistication of hedge funds and 
ignoring increased investor sophistication, the SEC has 
engaged in faulty reasoning. 
In addition to the SEC arbitrarily picking a restriction 
for the number of investors, it arbitrarily ensnares only hedge 
funds in its new proposal, while excluding other types of funds 
  
 193 See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 406. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See id. 
 198 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 199 Although many websites are unreliable or inaccurate, investors can choose 
from many reputable investment sites that provide a host of information about every 
investment concept. See, e.g., Forbes Home Page, http://www.forbes.com (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2008); CNBC Home Page, http://www.cnbc.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). 
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from the Accredited Investor Proposal. Although the SEC made 
it clear that it wanted to protect investors, it did not require 
investors in venture capital funds to meet the increased 
accredited investor standard in the December 2006 proposal.200 
The rationalization for the exception was that the SEC 
“recognize[s] the benefit that venture capital funds play in the 
capital formation of small businesses.”201 The rationale for this 
exception was questioned by Paul Atkins, an SEC commis-
sioner.202 Atkins pointed out that the risks that venture funds 
take are similar to those taken by hedge funds, and voiced his 
incredulity as to why the SEC would purposefully exclude 
venture funds while targeting hedge funds.203 When evaluating 
risk to small investors it is important to note that venture 
capital funds take enormous risks, and many of them have 
closed in recent years due to heavy losses.204 If the SEC has a 
legitimate interest in protecting small investors, then it follows 
that the same protection provided for hedge fund investors 
should be extended to those who invest in venture capital 
funds. Furthermore, hedge funds also provide benefits to the 
national economy, as has been touted by the former chairman 
of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan.205 Greenspan made 
the point that hedge funds that take large positions in the 
equity markets eliminate inefficiencies by “aligning markets 
and providing liquidity to markets.”206 Creating exceptions that 
favor venture capital funds, which arguably share the same 
  
 200 Paul S. Atkins, SEC Commissioner, Remarks Before the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago Seventh Annual Private Equity Conference (Aug. 2, 2007). Venture 
capital funds provide capital to small businesses and often help manage the business. 
See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 407-08. 
 201 Id. at 408 (“In proposing to exclude the offer and sale of securities issued 
by venture capital funds from the application of the proposed definition, therefore, we 
recognize the benefit that venture capital funds play in the capital formation of small 
businesses.”). 
 202 Atkins, supra note 200 (“Oddly, the changes in accreditation would not 
apply to venture capital funds. Is there a principled reason for treating venture capital 
funds differently than other private investment vehicles?”). 
 203 Id. 
 204 Miguel Helft, A Kink in Venture Capital’s Gold Chain, N.Y. TIMES,  
Oct. 7, 2006. The SEC also suffers from short-term memory loss when it comes to the 
impact that venture capital funds can play in the national economy. The “Internet 
bubble” of the late 1990s that led to the crash of the financial markets in 2001  
was partially a result of venture capital funds’ incessant drive to launch more and 
more Internet businesses. See Peter Elstrom, The Great Internet Money Game, BUS. 
WEEK, Apr. 16, 2001, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 
01_16/b3728602.htm. 
 205 Ron Oral, Greenspan Dislikes SEC Hedge Fund Rules, N.Y. L.J., July 22, 
2004, at 5. 
 206 Id. 
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qualities as those of hedge funds, is further evidence of the 
SEC’s interest in targeting the hedge fund industry with 
increased regulation. 
The SEC has created inconsistent regulations that are 
either unnecessary or represent a misguided attempt to 
address a poorly defined problem. The SEC never translated 
the increased size of the hedge fund industry into an 
identifiable problem. Even assuming that the increased size 
leads to an increased risk, the SEC has failed to create rules 
that would reduce the risk. As for hedge fund fraud, very few of  
the known cases of fraudulent activity in the industry would 
have been prevented by the Hedge Fund Rule.207 Finally, the 
SEC downplayed the effectiveness of the change in the accred-
ited investor standard, yet made it a proposal once the Hedge 
Fund Rule was vacated.208 The SEC has apparently adopted a 
mission to regulate the hedge fund industry regardless of the 
necessity for or effectiveness of its rulemaking. 
V.  NEW REGULATION: IS IT REALLY NECESSARY OR ARE 
SMALL INVESTORS PROTECTED? 
The SEC has made it a top priority to protect small 
investors from losing their investment in hedge funds. 
Protecting small investors from directly investing in hedge 
funds has been the cornerstone of the recent regulatory push 
by the agency.209 This has been the rallying cry for the SEC, 
  
 207 Atkins, supra note 152. 
 208 Hedge Fund Rule Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,064 (Dec. 10, 2004). 
 209 Id. at 72,057 (“[Of] significant concern is the growing exposure of smaller 
investors, pensioners, and other market participants, directly or indirectly, to hedge 
funds. Hedge fund investors are no longer limited to the very wealthy.”); Fraud & 
Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 400 (Jan. 4, 2007) (“We are concerned 
that the definition of ‘accredited investor’ . . . may not provide sufficient protection for 
investors.”). 
  The current credit crisis and economic downturn has greatly affected even 
the most “traditional” and stalwart of investment banks and funds. See Julie Creswell, 
A Nervous Wall St. Seems Unsure What’s Next, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2008, at C1. 
Specifically, the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 has caused considerable alarm 
in the investment community. Id. It is interesting to note that although many investors 
were wiped out on their investment in Bear Stearns, some hedge funds made huge 
profits. Gregory Zuckerman et al., Stocks Tumble Again, But Some Traders Win Big, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2008, at C1. Hedge funds sold short stock of Bear Stearns in the 
weeks leading up to the collapse. Id. Hedge funds were not alone, as a quarter of the 
total shares of Bear Stearns were sold short when the investment bank collapsed, 
thereby giving great returns to those that had bet against Bear Stearns. Id. This is just 
a small example of how hedge funds have made money by taking non-traditional and 
contrarian positions in the financial markets. Although there were obviously large 
risks in taking the position, those that invest in hedge funds often look to the fund as a 
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and is what apparently will continue to push the SEC to create 
more regulations. In the Accredited Investor Proposal, the SEC 
sought to protect small investors by excluding those it deemed 
too “small” to absorb a major loss in a hedge fund.210 The issue 
that will continue to be a dominant theme in the coming years 
is whether small investors are in need of the protection that 
the SEC has continued to offer. The practices that hedge funds 
employ when investors invest in a fund, in addition to certain 
requirements that hedge funds are forced to take under 
Regulation D, are arguably sufficient to protect small investors, 
making both the current proposals, as well as further 
regulation, unnecessary. 
The SEC has claimed that small investors need more 
protection against the risk of investing in hedge funds because 
small investors “may find it difficult to appreciate the unique 
risks of these pools.”211 Hedge funds must conform to a variety 
of Congressional Acts, including the Securities Act of 1933, 
which by its terms would require hedge funds to register and 
disclose.212 While Regulation D was set up as a safe harbor to 
allow private funds to avoid this regulation, it does not allow it 
free of charge. Investment companies that use Regulation D to 
avoid registration and reporting, as most hedge funds do, are 
forbidden from using advertisements, solicitations or online 
information to attract investors.213 Accordingly, Regulation D, 
together with the other legal structures unique to hedge funds, 
protects the small investor from “accidentally” investing in a 
vehicle that he thinks is safe and carries the same level of risk 
as any other investment option. The small investor is protec-
ted, therefore, from unknowingly investing in hedge funds 
because of the many red flags that are put up as warnings. 
The advertisement prohibitions, as well as the other 
unique hedge fund practices, can best be understood when 
compared to the investment procedures that mutual funds 
employ. Mutual funds are very similar to hedge funds. Mutual 
  
way to balance out the risks of investing in more traditional investment vehicles. See 
supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 
 210 See Fraud & Accredited Investor Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 412-13. 
 211 See id. at 404. Under the Securities Act, offerors of securities must provide 
the SEC with certain disclosures. SEC, supra note 32. The specific disclosure 
requirements include a description of the properties and business owned by the issuer, 
a description of the security being sold, information about the issuer’s management, 
and the issuer’s financial statements. Id. 
 212 STAFF REPORT, supra note 20, at 13. 
 213 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1)-(2) (2008). 
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funds invest in many different types of investments, including 
stocks and bonds, just as hedge funds do. Mutual funds are 
highly regulated and are limited in the risks that they can take 
and must report a tremendous amount of information to their 
investors and to the SEC.214 Hedge funds, on the other hand, 
have few requirements. In order to illustrate the protection 
afforded to small investors by hedge funds, it is valuable to 
compare the way that a small investor invests in hedge funds 
compared to mutual funds. The difference between the methods 
of investing is what raises the red flags for potential hedge 
fund investors. The differences put the investor on notice that 
this is not a lower-risk and more regulated mutual fund, but is 
a higher-risk investment vehicle. 
Mutual funds are inherently different than hedge funds, 
both in the reporting requirements and the rules governing 
their investment options. A mutual fund is a company that 
invests in stocks, bonds, and other types of securities with 
monies invested in it by investors.215 Mutual fund companies 
offer many different types of funds as options for investment, 
each with a specific target.216 The entire fund is its portfolio and 
investors buy shares in the combined portfolio where each 
share is the investor’s ownership portion of the fund.217 Mutual 
funds have three main identifying features. First, shares of 
mutual funds are bought and sold back to the fund itself and 
are not traded on a secondary market exchange.218 Second, 
mutual funds continuously create new shares of the fund as 
monies are received, thereby increasing the total assets of the 
fund.219 This allows easy access for new investors to invest in a 
mutual fund at any point in time.220 Third, mutual funds and 
  
 214 Shauna Croome-Carther, Watch Out for the Mutual Fund Metamorphosis, 
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/03/040203.asp 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
 215 SEC, Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/ 
investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2008). 
 216 For a list of the many different mutual funds that Fidelity alone offers, see 
Fidelity.com, Four and Five Star Fidelity Funds, http://personal.fidelity.com/products/ 
funds/framesets/four_and_five_frame.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). Funds range 
from those that focus on certain sectors such as international investments or real 
estate to index funds that encompass the market more broadly. Id. 
 217 SEC, supra note 215. 
 218 Id. Although there might not be a secondary market for the shares, shares 
of the fund can be easily redeemed and are priced at the funds’ “per share net asset 
value (NAV) plus any shareholder fees that the fund imposes at the time of purchase 
(such as sales loads).” Id. 
 219 Id. 
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their investment advisors must register with the SEC, and 
provide disclosure statements.221 The SEC, therefore, has a 
strong presence in the mutual fund world by forcing advisors to 
report details of the funds’ holdings and by governing their 
structure. These characteristics, including increased liquidity, 
the ease of purchasing and redeeming shares, the ability to 
invest in a fund mid-cycle, and the added protection of SEC 
oversight, are what give mutual fund investments their allure. 
It is therefore not surprising that mutual funds have 
become extremely popular. Part of this popularity can be 
attributed to the increased knowledge investors have about  
the funds and the ease of purchasing shares. Mutual funds 
advertise constantly and through every available medium.222 
The Internet has opened up a new arena in which funds can 
target the average consumer.223 In addition to more streamlined 
advertising, it is relatively simple to invest online in a mutual 
fund. This ease is similar to that typically associated with 
stocks. Mutual fund companies invite investors to open an 
account online and invest in a variety of their products, all  
with easy-to-read screens and simple instructions.224 For 
example, by clicking on one of the many mutual funds found on 
the website of Vanguard Investments, a popular mutual fund 
and retirement investment company, one can easily access the 
fund’s investment information and a link to “buy this fund.”225 
  
 221 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 84, app. A. 
 222 Drive on a popular highway and you will almost undoubtedly see a 
billboard for a mutual fund company. See Aaron Baar, Schwab’s ‘Talk to Chuck’  
Plays Chicago, ADWEEK.COM, Apr. 8, 2005, http://www.adweek.com/aw/esearch/article_ 
display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000874489. Open a magazine or turn on the television 
and there will likely be at least one ad touting the virtues of some mutual fund. 
 223 For example, at Vanguard.com, when potential investors enter the website, 
they are greeted with a full advertisement spread. See Vanguard Investments Home 
Page, www.vanguard.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). 
 224 Vanguard Investments, https://personal.vanguard.com/us/home (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2008). 
 225 See, e.g., Vanguard Capital Value Fund Overview, https://personal 
.vanguard.com/us/funds/snapshot?FundId=0328&FundIntExt=INT (last visited Mar. 
24, 2008). This is similar to the process of purchasing stocks over the Internet through 
online brokerage houses like E-trade Financial and Charles Schwab. See E-trade 
Financial, www.etrade.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2008); Charles Schwab, http:// 
charlesschwab.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). Part of the popularity of online trading 
stemmed from the so called “day trade craze” of the late 1990’s through 2000. Day 
trading became popular through a combination of a stock market boom in the late 
1990s and the Internet’s increased accessibility to trade stocks. Day trading became 
part of the popular culture and spawned legendary ad campaigns, including one  
about a tow truck driver who owns his own island and drives a truck “for fun.”  
Patrick McGeehan, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Drops a Familiar Image to Take  
Aim at Electronic Brokerage Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2000. 
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Hedge funds, and the rules that bind them, are a stark 
contrast to mutual funds. The small investor is put on notice 
many times before investing in a hedge fund that all funds are 
not alike. Hedge funds do not allow the ease of entry that 
characterizes mutual funds, nor do they offer instant liquidity 
or redemption benefits.226 Hedge funds neither advertise nor 
interact with the public the way that mutual funds do. Even 
the casual investor cannot mistake a hedge fund for a mutual 
fund, and therefore knows that this is not a typical investment. 
To become an investor in a hedge fund there are certain 
requirements. Hedge funds are set up with two companies: one 
company manages the fund and runs the other company, which 
holds the assets.227 There are three documents that an investor 
must be given before joining a hedge fund: a risk disclosure 
statement, a subscription agreement, and an operating agree-
ment.228 The purpose of the risk disclosure agreement is to 
warn the investor about every conceivable risk that could  
befall the fund.229 This document also lists the risks that are 
associated with the specific fund, in addition to the risks 
associated with all hedge funds.230 The subscription agreement 
requires the investor to list the amount of money he is 
investing in the fund, as well as a collection of personal 
information including investment history.231 One of the most 
important functions of the agreement is to certify that the 
investor is an “accredited investor” and is therefore authorized 
to invest in the fund.232 An investor must declare that he is in 
compliance with both the income and net worth rules, as laid 
  
 226 SEC, Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up On Hedge Funds and Funds of 
Hedge Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2008) 
(“Hedge funds typically limit opportunities to redeem, or cash in, your shares (e.g., to 
four times a year), and often impose a ‘lock-up’ period of one year or more, during 
which you cannot cash in your shares.”). Id. 
 227 See DANIEL A. STRACHMAN, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF HEDGE FUND 
MANAGEMENT 39 (2007). 
 228 See STUART A. MCCRARY, HOW TO CREATE AND MANAGE A HEDGE FUND 105 
(2002); STRACHMAN, supra note 227, at 41. 
 229 See MCCRARY, supra note 228, at 105. 
 230 Id. at 105-06. The primary purpose of the hedge fund manager’s listing 
every possible risk is to insure against any potential litigious fallout as a result of a 
fund collapse. In fact, it is in the best interest of the manager to disclose all of the dire 
risks to investors, if only to further protect the manager. This disclosure may, however, 
be a double-edged sword: listing every remote risk may cause investors to ignore all of 
the risks due to “risk overload.” Still, disclosure puts investors on notice that a hedge 
fund has certain risks that are not found in mutual funds, where a separate risk 
disclosure is not a part of the investment procedure. 
 231 STRACHMAN, supra note 227, at 41. 
 232 See MCCRARY, supra note 228, at 106. 
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out by the accredited investor standard, and has sufficient 
investment knowledge and sophistication to invest in a fund.233 
The third document is the operating agreement where the 
investor agrees to have his money managed by the advisor.234 
Part of the agreement is the assent to the lock-up period that 
the hedge fund requires, during which time an investor’s 
money cannot be withdrawn.235 The liquidity that is common to 
stocks and mutual funds is all but absent from hedge funds. 
Hedge fund investors typically face a lock-up period of at least 
a year from the time they make the investment.236 
These requirements as a whole create a different 
investing environment for hedge funds than for mutual funds. 
The risk disclosure is given instead of a prospectus237 to the 
potential investor, thereby making the investor aware, not only 
of the investment style of the fund, but of the very real poten-
tial for loss. Furthermore, the investor must give a multitude of 
information and sign a document certifying himself as an 
accredited investor, one who understands the nature and risks 
involved. Finally, the investor must sign a document agreeing 
to have his money managed and to have it locked up for a 
specific period of time, only to be made available for a specific 
day after which it gets locked up again. All of these steps to 
become a hedge fund investor put the investor on notice that he 
is investing in a different and higher risk vehicle. 
In addition to the internal procedures required to 
become an investor, Regulation D prohibits hedge funds from 
soliciting or advertising to the general public. If a hedge fund 
wants to avoid registration with the SEC under the Securities 
Act, it must comply with Regulation D and refrain from 
advertising to the public.238 The effect of this ban is that the 
average investor is often unable to identify individual hedge 
fund companies, and cannot determine how to invest in the 
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 234 See STRACHMAN, supra note 227, at 41. 
 235 See MCCRARY, supra note 228, at 44. 
 236 SEC, supra note 226. 
 237 A prospectus is a legal document offered to investors that detail the facts 
about the investment that are needed to make an informed decision. Investopedia.com, 
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fund.239 This is in sharp contrast to how mutual funds target 
investors with “one-click buying.” Accordingly, the protection of 
small investors with the Regulation D provisions, coupled with 
the legal and practical structures that hedge funds employ, has 
the effect of preventing the casual investor from investing in 
hedge funds without understanding, or at least realizing the 
potential risks that are involved. 
As a result of this combination, small investors are 
adequately protected from investing in hedge funds. If a small 
investor chooses to invest in hedge funds directly, the investor 
must seek out a hedge fund due to Regulation D’s ban on 
advertisement of any kind. Once a small investor finds a fund 
to invest in, the investor is warned many times throughout  
the process that becoming an investor in a hedge fund is unlike 
investing in traditionally safer, less risky mutual funds. This 
knowledge is the protection that investors need to prevent 
them from “accidentally” investing in a high risk vehicle. The 
decision to invest, however, remains theirs alone. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Underpinning every instance of SEC rule-making is the 
presumption that there is an identifiable problem whose 
solution lies in more regulation. This Note has shown, however, 
that in the case of hedge funds the SEC has rushed to address 
a problem that has not been fully substantiated, and further  
it has proposed a solution that fails to solve the purported 
problem. In addition, the arbitrary and inconsistent manner in 
which the SEC has formulated the proposals demonstrates a 
singular motive to regulate, regardless of the wisdom of its 
approach. This singular focus has largely been premised on the 
need to protect small investors from investing in hedge funds. 
The agency argues that small investors should be protected 
from hedge funds because of the high risks that hedge funds 
take—risks that a small investor is presumed to be too small to 
bear. Small investors, however, are adequately protected. The 
  
 239 It is difficult to find information on the Internet for Grosvenor Capital 
Management, one of the world’s largest funds of funds, having almost $20 billion in 
assets. Press Release, Hedge Fund Intelligence, Funds of Funds Industry Sees Stellar 
Growth in 2006 (Feb. 12, 2007), available at http://www.hedgefundintelligence.com/ 
images/590/investhedgebilliondollarrelease.pdf. Its home page contains a logo, a 
company address, and an e-mail link for employment interest. Grosvenor Capital 
Management, http://www.grosvenorcapitalmanagement.com (last visited Mar. 24, 
2008). The site does not even mention what the company does. Id. 
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average investor would have great difficulty in finding a hedge 
fund due to the advertisement prohibition of Regulation D.240 
Even once a hedge fund is found, the process of becoming a 
hedge fund investor puts the investor on notice that it is not a 
typical investment and is likely to involve higher risks. 
Investors must sign an agreement asserting that they meet the 
accredited investor standard in addition to a risk disclosure 
document outlining the many risks associated with the fund. 
Also, investors must agree to lock up their investment for a 
specified period of time. All of these requirements are generally 
absent from other similar investments, including mutual funds, 
and they have the effect of warning the investor of the risks 
associated with hedge funds. Once an investor knows of the 
risks, it is then his decision whether to take on those risks. 
Beginning with the Hedge Fund Rule, the SEC has 
made clear that it wants to regulate hedge funds. Releasing 
proposed regulations only months after the Hedge Fund Rule 
was invalidated by Goldstein is firm evidence that the SEC is 
intent on regulating the industry. The regulation trend is likely 
to continue, spurred by the SEC’s success in passing its anti-
fraud rules. With a national recession looming in 2008, the 
SEC is likely to use any hedge fund that collapses as evidence 
of the risks involved in investing in hedge funds as well as the 
need for more regulation. Prior to the bout of regulations 
beginning in 2004,241 the SEC was satisfied in its role as a 
hedge fund spectator. Now it seems that the SEC will not stop 
until it is holding the hedge fund playbook. 
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